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Design/methodology/approach: In this article, the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness is 
viewed from the standpoints of the transcendental-phenomenological and dialectical 
approaches and is analyzed through the prism of the principle of onto-gnoseological 
uncertainty.
Findings: It is shown that the way of formulating the ‘hard problem’ in the analytical 
philosophical tradition inevitably makes it a pseudo-problem. At the same time, with the 
consistent realization of the principle of onto-gnoseological uncertainty, the antinomy 
of solutions to the problems of consciousness is eliminated, which opens up a way to 
a productive solution of problems related to the interpretation of consciousness both 
in natural sciences and in philosophy.
Originality/value: This research reveals the methodological potential of applying 
the principle of onto-gnoseological uncertainty to the problems that arise in modern 
philosophy in connection with the achievements of natural sciences.
Keywords: hard problem of consciousness; consciousness and brain; subjective reality; 
qualia; onto-gnoseological uncertainty.
Introduction
Based on modern research in the field of the philosophy of consciousness 
and, at the same time, applying the transcendental-phenomenological and 
dialectical approaches to this problem, the authors of this research view the 
hard problem of consciousness in a completely new light. The methodology 
of analytical philosophy, which goes back to the works of L. Wittgenstein 
(1994) and B. Russel (1999), is based on the principle of logical analysis 
in the solution of philosophical problems. Nevertheless, logical analysis 
works well when reviewing ‘easy’ problems, i.e. problems that do not go 
beyond a single level of language, and their formulations do not require 
switching to a meta-language. When an analytic approach is applied to 
problems that cannot be expressed only in the object language, this leads 
to the emergence of semantic paradoxes, and to the emergence of ‘hard’ 
problems in the philosophical context. Unfortunately, analytic philosophy 
has never paid attention to the fact that it is the attempt to formulate the 
problem of consciousness by analytical methods that leads to paradoxes (as 
will be shown below), thereby making the problem of consciousness receives 
a ‘hard’ problem (Chalmers 1995; Horst 2014; Carruthers, Schier 2017a).
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The objective of this article is, first of all, to show that the very method 
of asking and resolving questions about consciousness in analytic philos-
ophy inevitably turns it into a pseudo-problem (i.e. the problem that has 
a wrong wording, whose statements results in paradoxes). The authors 
of this research present four reasons and four ways of argumentation for 
revealing its pseudo nature. Secondly, they demonstrate that with the correct 
formulation of questions about consciousness (in which consciousness 
is viewed not as a completely unique phenomenon but as a form of the 
evolution of matter), it is possible to apply a constructive approach to the 
solution of the problems of consciousness. As such, the authors propose 
the principle of the onto-gnoseological uncertainty (Mamchenkov 2017).
1. Literature Review
Since the end of the 20th century and to this day, the hard problem of 
consciousness has been one of the main themes of analytic philosophy. 
A great number of journals, collections, and monographs are published in 
the framework of the paradigm of the ‘hard problem’ (Menon 2014; Tsou 
2014; McBride 2014; Smythies 2017; Smith, Whitaker 2014). However, when 
formulating the ‘hard problem of consciousness’, the reality of consciousness 
is ontologized, and the word ‘reality’ is added to the subject to somehow 
juxtapose it with the objective reality. It is impossible to speak of either 
knowledge or consciousness in the ontological sense and to attribute to them 
existence as the objective reality. It can be stated that it is the subject that 
endows objects with a reality – the question of reality and, on the contrary, 
unreality of a certain object is meaningful only from the perspective of the 
subject of cognition. The world itself is complete, and only a subject can 
add non-existence into it (Sartre 2002). Therefore, a subject does not imply 
a special reality but something that makes it possible to see reality. “For 
us, there is no way to display subjectivity as part of our worldview, because 
the subjectivity we are interested is, so to say, is a display itself. Meanwhile, 
the solution will not imply an attempt to develop a special type of display – 
something like hyper-introspection – but rather in completely quitting the 
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attempts to display and simply admitting facts. Facts, in their turn, imply 
that biological processes generate conscious mental phenomena that are 
irreducibly subjective” (Searle 2002, 105).
The ephemeral nature of the ‘subjective reality’ also confirms the im-
possibility to prove the presence of consciousness in another person – the 
so-called ‘zombie argument’ widely discussed in analytic philosophy (Chal-
mers 1997). Despite the achievements of neurophysiology, which makes it 
possible to record even the physiological correlates of the self-identification 
process, any argumentation of the presence of consciousness in another 
subject inevitably rests on the self-report of this subject. ‘The zombie 
argument’ proves only one thing: the elimination of the ‘subjective reality’ 
does not change the ontological picture of the world. However, it is equally 
unreasonable to deny consciousness as a gnoseological phenomenon. 
At the same time, it is important to refer to a number of works that note 
a tendency to debunk the paradigmatic significance of a hard problem, and 
try to view the ‘difficulty’ of the latter from aside (Carruthers G., Schier E. 
2017, Why are We Still Being Hornswoggled? Dissolving the Hard Problem 
of Consciousness; McClelland T. 2017, The Problem of Consciousness: 
Easy, Hard or Tricky?; Bielas J. 2017, The View from Within the Brain: Does 
Neurofeedback Close the Gap?). This research continues this line and relies 
on the domestic approach and original methodological developments.
2. Methods
As shown by the development of philosophy in the 20th–21st centuries, which 
preserved the status of the ‘hard’ (i.e. intrinsically unsolvable) problem of 
consciousness for a long time, the existing methods and approaches are 
not enough, especially in the light of the emergence of new philosophical 
concepts and achievements of natural sciences related to the study of the 
human brain and consciousness. Therefore, the authors of this research rely 
on an essentially new approach formulated as the principle of onto-gnose-
ological uncertainty (Mamchenkov 2014). 
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The principle of onto-gnoseological uncertainty is a philosophical 
method that lies in the impossibility to separate the problem of an object’s 
essence from the problem of its cognizance, with a recognition of the 
different natures of these problems and, accordingly, the different natures 
of the answers to them. In the conceptualization of an object of cognition, 
two questions are inevitably linked together, in particular, the question 
about the essence of a given object (the ontological question) and the 
question of the givenness of an object to the cognizing consciousness (the 
gnoseological question). This is the inseparability point of ontological and 
gnoseological inquiries. At the same time, it is impossible to substitute one 
question with the other since it is impossible to reduce one to the other. 
Despite the simplicity and obviousness of these statements, there are a lot 
of examples of this kind of substitutions and reductions in the history of 
philosophy. It is these moments that cause ‘hard’ problems. 
Does the consistent implementation of the principle of onto-gnoseo-
logical uncertainty imply the need to split reality? There is no need to split 
reality since, firstly, the objective reality and the ‘world of consciousness’ are 
displayed as answers to different questions (ontological or gnoseological). 
Secondly, revealing the irreducibility of the reality of consciousness to the 
reality of the brain is not something unique to science. The same is true when 
speaking about the irreducibility of a chemical reality to a physical reality 
or a social reality to a biological reality. In every layer of reality studied by 
science, there are laws and principles that are not reducible to ‘lower’ layers. 
Moreover, there is a possibility for feedback, i.e. ‘higher’ layers can influence 
the functioning of lower layers, for example, the way a person’s social activity 
affects the formation and development of his or her brain (Swaab 2014).
3. Why the ‘Hard Problem of Consciousness’  
is a pseudo problem? 
The basic result of this research – the most accessible and precise one 
– is related to the demonstration of the fact that the ‘hard problem of 
consciousness’, as it appears in modern analytic philosophy, is rather 
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a pseudo-problem than a ‘hard’ problem. To prove this postulate, the 
authors of this research present four lines of argumentation with each line 
supplementing the previous one.
1. Uncertainty of concepts. There is no clear-cut definition of conscious-
ness either in philosophy or in scientific discourse. In similar cases, the 
pseudo-principle of ‘family resemblance’ (which makes it easy to establish 
a connection even between a fly and an elephant) is often recalled, which, 
nevertheless, makes things more obscure. Three related terms are used: 
psyche, consciousness, and thinking. The meanings of the latter are different 
but these differences are often not conceptualized. This determines the first 
‘difficulty’ of consciousness, in particular, it may seem that one aspect or 
interpretation of consciousness has been explained, but then the explanation 
slips away and dissolves in other aspects. For example, when investigating 
the connection between ‘qualia’ and the brain, it is necessary to recall the 
objective content of consciousness. Trying to examine the intersubjective 
content of consciousness, it is necessary to speak about the consciousness 
of a subject endowed with will.
It is generally accepted that the ‘consciousness-brain’ problem becomes 
a historical continuation of the research on the relationship between spirit 
and matter in the modern era. However, the transition of both sides of this 
relationship is quite obscure. ‘Consciousness’ and ‘spirit’ refer to different 
aspects of the subject matter the authors of this research are interested in. 
Dubrovsky (2012, 244–245) shows that the other side of the relationship, i.e. 
the ‘physical reality’ remains unclarified and blurry in analytic philosophy, 
which leads to difficulties in such theories. At the same time, the under-
standing of the multi-dimensionality of reality, which has been studied by 
various specific sciences, and a clear separation of these dimensions could 
substantially clarify this problem.
2. Reduction. In analytic philosophy, the problem of consciousness is 
often reduced to the problem of ‘qualia’, i.e. the subjective representation 
of mental processes. However, ‘rediscovering’ (Searle 2002) or ‘explaining’ 
(Dennett 1991) consciousness rather than grasping the indicated connection, 
one expects to understand the correlation between the objective content of 
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consciousness and individual consciousness, invariant laws and meanings 
inherent in consciousness and specific manifestations of matter.
Suppose that we have found a final answer to the ‘hard problem’. Does 
this mean that it would be possible to understand “Ulysses” after examining 
Joyce’s brain? Or, would it be possible to better understand the principles 
of quantum mechanics after examining Bohr’s brain? The comic nature 
of these ‘achievements’ shows the impossibility to completely solve the 
problem under study within the framework of this paradigm, i.e. the incorrect 
formulation of the problem. On the other hand, the assumption of giving 
a solution to the hard problem presupposes that a thorough examination of 
a person’s brain would lead to a perusal of the whole content of a person’s 
consciousness. But this is not yet ‘comprehension’ of consciousness but 
simply a fixation of the interrelation between consciousness and the brain, 
which is obvious even without hard theoretical postulates and is illustrated 
by a simple blow on the head. Similarly, by deciphering a genome and 
establishing its interrelation with the characteristics that are encoded to it, 
one cannot understand and predict the behavior of not only a human being 
but also of a simpler being (although even with DNA, one should not forget 
about the complex, non-linear, and even reciprocal connection between the 
genotype and phenotype (Mednikov 1982)). 
3. Elimination of other paradigms. In the analytical tradition, the hard 
problem of consciousness is viewed as something new and previously 
unexplored. However, it is necessary to point out that the problem of in-
teraction between various forms of being and levels of matter organization 
has long been productively discussed in various philosophical areas. Even 
in particular scientific research, very often there is a need to encounter 
a supply of questions related to the interaction between various forms of 
the material world: from the irreducibility of chemism to physical laws (be 
it classical electro-dynamics or quantum mechanics (Hendry 2006)) to the 
development of methods for the technical analysis of the dynamics of the 
cost of various assets on the stock exchanges that make the basis for the 
earnings of speculators. Why, for example, in the study of biological reality, 
isn’t the irreducibility of biological laws to chemical laws regarded as ‘hard’ 
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and why doesn’t this cause a sense of mysteriousness? This irreducibility 
is quite obvious to a researcher just like the fact that without violating the 
basic laws of chemistry, biological objects produce novelty in chemistry itself 
and generate organic substances and ‘human’ chemistry (Lamza 2014), and 
the laws by which they function. In the 18–19th centuries, during the period 
when the classical scientific paradigm was formed in biology, problems of 
the essence of life and the mysterious ‘vital principle’, the false acuity of 
which is very similar to the hard problem of consciousness, were actively 
discussed in the philosophy of biology. And only against the background 
of the successes of positive biology, these problems were forgotten and 
eliminated from philosophical discourse. Nevertheless, these problems 
remained unsolved in their antinomical formulation. Any attempt to com-
bine philosophical and specific scientific problems and approaches to their 
solution is initially doomed to failure. Therefore, most likely, in 50 years, 
today’s discourse of analytic philosophers on the nature of consciousness 
will seem as naive as the 19th-century philosophy of life to modern people.
The first consequence of this ‘historical blindness’ is related to the 
inattention to the fact that the brain is an object while consciousness is 
a process. Therefore, it is extremely hard to speak about objects in the 
language of a process. If, on the contrary, try to establish a correlation of 
the processes of consciousness not only with the brain but with the entire 
complex of processes occurring to man (first of all, the ones included in 
social practice (Metlov 2003)), a hard problem will perhaps lose a significant 
part of its mysteriousness.
4. Misunderstanding of the principle  
of onto-gnoseological uncertainty
In the explanation of consciousness, objectification is at the heart of the 
emergence of ‘hard problems’, i.e. researchers unreasonably objectify 
consciousness and consider the process as an object. Hereafter, there arises 
a question of considering consciousness through its material basis, i.e. the 
reduction of one object to another. If the question initially consisted in 
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understanding the material foundations of a certain process, it would imply 
dependence rather than reduction. In the context of today’s widespread 
understanding, the emergence of an unsolvable problem will be inevitable. 
The modern interpretation of the problem of consciousness conceptu-
ally goes back to the problem of the soul and body and was formulated by 
R. Descartes (1989). As demonstrated by T.A. Varkhotov (2003), this problem, 
in essence, becomes ‘hard’ due to the transference of gnoseological answers 
(‘certainty’ as a criterion of the cognition method) to anthropological ques-
tions (the existence of consciousness within the human body). Therefore, 
the analytical approach will inevitably suffer antinomy. 
The second, concomitant result of this research is related to the demon-
stration of the fact that not only the existing formulations of the problem of 
consciousness in the analytical tradition give it a status of a pseudo-problem, 
but, on the whole, the analytical approach to the problem of consciousness 
will collide with an inevitable antinomy. When studying the nature of 
consciousness in the analytical paradigm, two opposing and intrinsically 
contradictory understandings of consciousness are manifested, and the 
so-called antinomy of consciousness is formed: consciousness as an object 
and consciousness as a subject. 
Perceiving consciousness as an object, we put it in a row with other 
objects of the external world like a table, a house, etc. Consciousness appears 
as an object accessible to objective description. Suppose that this approach 
to the study of consciousness is brought to its logical conclusion, and 
a complete theory of consciousness has been formed. In this case, both all 
objects of ‘qualia’ and subjectively presented properties are available to an 
external observer. This means that studying the description of consciousness 
that is in pain, a researcher will also experience pain. If feeling pain remains 
imperceptible and the research notice only the state of the brain, it would 
mean that pain ‘itself’ managed to ‘slip away’ from research and remained 
in the ‘subjective world’, i.e. consciousness (leastways, the consciousness 
of the researcher) is a subject separated from an object (Tegmark 2015). 
Thereat, we postulate consciousness as a subject endowed with private 
access to the world of ‘qualia’. In this case, however, it will be hard for 
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subject-consciousness to interact with the surrounding world and to control 
one’s own body. Any interaction between subject-consciousness and the 
surrounding world draws it into the cause-and-effect conditioning of the 
objective reality, which tears consciousness out of the allotted subjective 
world and again places it on a par with the objects of the world. A way 
out of this kind of objectification would require a dualistic approach, or 
a boundless expansion of consciousness, subjective idealism. However, 
modern philosophy does not view these concepts seriously (Kuznetsov 2014).
Is it possible to speak of consciousness as an independent layer of 
reality? The most important criterion for objective existence implies the 
selection of invariants, for example, time invariance (maintaining an 
object’s existence for a certain period of time) or subject invariance (the 
independence of existence from the thinking of a particular subject).
1) The certainty of the existence of the ‘subjective reality’ at least as 
a delusion of a subject; 
2) the preservation of the unity of apperception as a condition for the 
unity of the field of experience; 
3) the accessibility of both the content of a subject and the mode of 
its representation to a subject’s cognition, as well as the addition of 
a cognizer to each cognition act.
The above laws are invariants and demonstrate the self-delusion and 
independence of the reality of consciousness. Consequently, to understand 
the interrelation between consciousness and bodily processes that form its 
foundations does not yet mean to understand consciousness (Naidysh 2017). 
Conclusions
Modern studies in the field of the philosophy of consciousness are conducted 
within a paradigm that contains unavoidable defects and antinomies, 
which lead to the transformation of the problem of consciousness into 
a ‘hard problem’. The four reasons that make the problem of consciousness 
not only a ‘hard’ problem but an unsolvable one (and, in some sense, 
‘a pseudo-problem’) include the uncertainty of concepts; reductionism; 
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the elimination of other paradigms, in which the problem of consciousness 
could be quite simple; and, above all, the misunderstanding of the principle 
of onto-gnoseological uncertainty. 
The elimination of the above-described contradiction is achieved through 
the realization of its foundation, i.e. the understanding that it is possible to 
speak of consciousness as an object that has a definite ontological status. 
In its essence, the subjective reality is the objectification of cognitive 
activity. Psychology convincingly demonstrates that the ‘subjective reality’ 
dissolves with the suspension of cognitive activity (Lebedev 2002). In fact, it 
is expected to receive an ontological answer to the gnoseological question 
that arises when studying the ‘subjective reality’. This situation is defined 
by the authors of this research as onto-gnoseological uncertainty.
Realizing the pseudo-nature of the ‘difficulty’ of the ‘hard problem’, 
philosophy should realize the impossibility of combining philosophical 
and scientific problems, i.e. particular sciences are not able to solve philo-
sophical problems since a similar path leads to reductionism. On the other 
hand, philosophy, in its turn, should not impose its own vision of certain 
problems on particular sciences, which is precisely what happens when 
imposing the division between the subjective and objective reality. The 
correct implementation of the principle of onto-gnoseological uncertainty 
with regard to questions of consciousness will allow philosophy to return to 
the actual philosophical questions. This, first of all, implies the definition 
of the key categories used by science and, secondly, the definition of the 
ontological status of different layers of reality and the possibilities of the 
cognition of these layers.
This article demonstrates that it is impossible to reduce human con-
sciousness to the brain and leads to the recognition that the physical repro-
duction of the human brain does not yet mean perceiving consciousness in 
it. Further research on the qualities of the human intellect should be based 
on a comprehensive view of the work of these qualities and should unite the 
subjective and objective, as well as personal and social components in the 
work of consciousness, which presently has critical practical significance 
in the light of elaborations in the field of artificial intelligence. 
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